Gun violence remains a serious issue in the United States. The Gun Violence Archive reports that between January 1, 2023, and May 1, 2023 there have been 185 mass shootings that injured 744 people and killed 252 people.1 In 2008, the United States Supreme Court held that the Second Amendment protects an individual right to possess firearms, separate and apart from militia service in Heller v. District of Columbia.2 This right is held by “the people.” Yet, the Court has simultaneously held that noncitizens are not part of “the people” guaranteed a right to bear arms. In the Second Amendment context “the people” has been defined as citizens. Pratheepan Gulasekaram’s forthcoming article in the Vanderbilt Law Review explores the Supreme Court’s expansion of individual gun rights while shrinking the Court’s conception of “the people.” Gulasekaram offers a more capacious interpretation of “the people” and his analysis offers an approach for noncitizen inclusion in other core constitutional rights.
The Second Amendment’s “People” Problem begins with a history of federal regulation of gun possession and noncitizens. Gulasekaram demonstrates how the restrictions implemented stemmed from a desire to limit specific ideologies and subversive activities. Noncitizens in this context were viewed as threats to the constitutional order. Under a pre-Heller Second Amendment that focused on organized armed defense of the constitutional order, noncitizens viewed as a threat could not be viewed as “the people” who would protect the constitutional order. In Part II, Gulasekaram demonstrates how Heller’s emphasis on an individual right to self-defense does not lend itself to the same wholesale exclusion of noncitizens from “the people.” Part III presents Gulasekaram’s argument that once the right to bear arms is rooted in an individual right based on self-protection, the rationale for connecting gun rights to citizenship status disappears.
Part I of The Second Amendment’s “People” Problem does an excellent job demonstrating that historical limitations on noncitizen gun ownership were rooted in “baked-in social hierarchies and stereotypes.” (P. 8.) Gulasekaram explores how the initial regulation of gun possession by disfavored groups “either conflated citizenship with race, or traded on the notion that immigrants were the source of anti-American and subversive ideologies.” (Pp. 7-8.) Federal immigration law in the early 1900s reflected concerns about noncitizens and anti-American ideologies. For example, the 1903 Immigration Act prohibited the entry and naturalization of “anarchists.” In 1918, Congress passed the Alien Anarchists Exclusion Act, which banned the entry of individuals who advocated or taught the overthrow of the American government and allowed for their deportation. The growing connection between noncitizens and dangerousness allowed California to enact a law in 1923 banning “unnaturalized foreign-born person[s]” from possessing firearms.”3
Another important contribution made in Part I is illustrating the role of the powerful gun lobby in encouraging lawmakers to regulate immigrants rather than firearms. Building on the growing concerns about noncitizens’ anti-American ideology, in the 1920s and 1930s the United States Revolver Association (“USRA”) deployed campaigns arguing that significant gun regulation was anti-American and rooted in foreign ideologies. Advocacy campaigns argued that “[r]ather than regulate firearms, Congress should regulate the source of the true danger: immigrants.” (P. 11.) The National Rifle Association continued these themes, arguing that expansive gun rights should exist for “citizen sportsmen, hunters, and private owners,” and that regulation could and should exist for “undesirable aliens” and “Fifth Columnists.” (P. 12.)
In Part II, Gulasekaram argues that the grounding of the Second Amendment in a right to self-defense invites a new examination of “the people” who are guaranteed the right to bear arms. One important part of the analysis Gulasekaram offers in this section is how the Court’s analysis of “the people” is based on the Court’s 1990 decision in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez. Construing the Fourth Amendment, the Court defined “the people” as those individuals who are “part of the national community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection to the country to be considered part of that community.”4 Gulasekaram notes how in Heller the Court changed “national community” to “political community” and eliminates the alternative approach based on “sufficient connection to the country.” (P. 19.) These modifications make it possible to interpret “the people” as citizens.
Part III offers a new approach to “the people” that is rooted in the justification for an individual right to bear arms offered in Heller and reinforced in New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn v. Bruen.5 Those cases decouple the right from organized community protection of the state, or from the state, and base it instead on the right to protect individuals from private violence. Based on this approach to the Second Amendment, “the people” are “all those who may need arms for protection of self, loved-ones, or home.”6 Gulasekaram notes that the rights of citizens and noncitizens are often inextricably linked. Many immigrant families are mixed-status families, and depriving noncitizens of the right to self-defense through firearms will also deprive citizens of their right to self-protection. Gulasekaram does not argue that “the people” has no limitations, or that firearm regulation is impossible. Rather he argues that as a right of self-defense “immigration status bears no relationship either to the need for protection nor the ability to wield a firearm safely, in the way status as a minor or mental-illness might.” (P. 49.) Gulasekaram contends that limitations on Second Amendment rights should “closely track the inability of governments to ensure the safe, non-criminal use of the firearm.” (P. 50.)
The Second Amendment’s “People” Problem does an excellent job of demonstrating the internal tensions within the Court’s jurisprudence defining “the people” for Second Amendment purposes and detailing the history of limitations on noncitizen gun ownership. These insights raise significant questions about the accuracy and wisdom of defining noncitizens out of “the people.” The approach Gulasekaram offers provides a model for rethinking noncitizens’ constitutional rights.
- Gun Violence Archive, Mass Shootings 2023 (last visited May 1, 2023).
- 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
- See In re Ramirez, 193 Cal. 633, 636 (1924).
- 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).
- 142 S.Ct. 2111 (2022).
- Id.
